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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAKOTAH V. SMITH,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45714
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-9683

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a serious car accident, Dakotah V. Smith was convicted of vehicular
manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving without privileges, and was
sentenced to an aggregate unified term of fifteen years, with three and one-half years fixed. He
appeals from his judgment of conviction, challenging his sentence as an abuse of discretion.
Mr. Smith contends he should have received a substantially shorter sentence considering the
significant mitigating factors that exist in this case. Most importantly, Mr. Smith has at all times
denied being the driver at the time of the accident, and himself sustained serious injuries in the
accident. While Mr. Smith recognizes the jury found him guilty, he contends a lengthy term of
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imprisonment is not warranted considering the sentencing factors.

Mr. Smith respectfully

requests that this Court reduce his aggregate sentence to a unified term of ten years, with two
years fixed, or remand this case to the district court for resentencing.

Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings
On July 1, 2016, Mr. Smith was involved in a serious car accident which resulted in the
death of Adrian Shaw and significant injuries to Mr. Smith and the other person in the car at the
time of the accident, Cody Sikes. Mr. Smith, Mr. Shaw, and Mr. Sikes had been drinking
together prior to the accident, first at a baseball game and then at a bar in Garden City. (PSI,
pp.122-25.) At approximately 1:25 a.m., Mr. Smith, Mr. Shaw, and Mr. Sikes declined the
bartender’s offer of a cab, and left the bar together, in a vehicle belonging to Mr. Shaw’s wife.
(Tr., p.110, Ls.5-13; PSI, pp.125-26.) The vehicle traveled just under a mile, when it struck a
tree at a speed of between 25 and 35 miles per hour. (Tr., p.269, Ls.16-18; PSI, p.105.)
The eyewitness who called 911, Mr. Montford, told the police he saw two men standing
at the rear passenger side of the vehicle immediately after the accident, and all four doors were
shut.

(PSI, p.107.)

Mr. Montford said Mr. Sikes told him he wanted to lie down, so

Mr. Montford opened the rear passenger door and helped Mr. Sikes into the back seat of the
vehicle.

(PSI, p.107.)

When emergency medical personnel arrived on scene, they found

Mr. Sikes lying face down across the back seats. (PSI, pp.4, 105.) Mr. Shaw was in the front
passenger seat. (PSI, pp.4, 105.) Mr. Smith was lying in the grass near the rear passenger side
of the vehicle. (PSI, pp.4, 105.) All three men were transported to the hospital. (PSI, p.106.)
Mr. Shaw died of his injuries at the hospital. (PSI, pp.106, 110.) Mr. Sikes sustained injuries to
his head and left leg. (PSI, p.122.) Mr. Smith dislocated his knee and fractured his femur. (PSI,
p.17.)
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When questioned at the hospital, Mr. Sikes said he was pretty sure Mr. Smith was
driving, but could not be certain. (PSI, p.122.) Mr. Smith said he was not driving and did not
remember who was driving. (PSI, p.104.) Mr. Smith’s blood alcohol content was measured at
0.165. (PSI, p.322.) Mr. Sikes’ blood alcohol content was never measured.
Almost a year after the accident, Mr. Smith was charged by Information with vehicular
manslaughter, driving under the influence of alcohol, and driving without privileges. (R., pp.6566.) The case proceeded to trial. (R., pp.96-111.) Mr. Sikes was asked on cross-examination,
“Do you know where you were before the crash?” (Tr., p.158, Ls.24-25.) He answered, “Not
for sure.” (Tr., p.159, L.1) Mr. Smith testified he could not remember anything between leaving
the baseball game and waking up in the hospital.

(Tr., p.328, Ls.13-16.)

The first law

enforcement officer who arrived on scene was asked if he was able to determine at the scene if
anybody had been driving, and he testified that he “attempted to figure that out” but was not able
to make a determination. (Tr., p.197, Ls.1-3, p.205, Ls.17-21.) Defense counsel argued in
closing that the only question for the jury to determine was “who was driving.” (Tr., p.375,
Ls.5-6.) The jury found Mr. Smith guilty on all counts. (R., pp.96-111, 146)
After trial, Mr. Smith filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 34,
arguing the evidence was insufficient to show he was driving at the time of the accident.
(R., pp.149-52.) The State filed an objection to Mr. Smith’s motion. (R., pp.153-56.) The
district court construed the motion as a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, and denied the
motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. (Tr., p.399, Ls.11-22, p.406,
L.18 – p.407, L.11, p.410, Ls.23-25; R., p.159.) For vehicular manslaughter and driving under
the influence of alcohol, the district court sentenced Mr. Smith to two unified terms of fifteen
years, with three and one-half years fixed, to be served concurrently. (Tr., p.444, L.22 – p.445,
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L.14.) For driving without privileges, the district court sentenced Mr. Smith to time served.
(Tr., p.447, Ls.9-16.) The judgment of conviction was entered on December 22, 2017, and
Mr. Smith filed a timely notice of appeal on January 8, 2018. (R., pp.165-69, 175-77.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Smith to an aggregate unified
term of fifteen years, with three and one-half years fixed, considering the mitigating factors that
exist in this case?

ARGUMENT
Considering The Mitigating Factors That Exist In This Case, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Smith To An Aggregate Unified Term Of Fifteen Years, With
Three And One-Half Years Fixed
Mr. Smith asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate unified sentence of
fifteen years, with three-and-a-half years fixed, is excessive. Where, as here, the sentence
imposed by the district court is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of
demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011)
(quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 875 (2011)).

“When a trial court exercises its

discretion in sentencing, ‘the most fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting
State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608 (1991)). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.” Id. (citation omitted). “When reviewing the
reasonableness of a sentence this Court will make an independent examination of the record,
‘having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the
public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
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The sentence the district court imposed upon Mr. Smith was not reasonable considering
the nature of his offense, his character, and the protection of the public interest. The act of
drinking and driving is extremely serious, but Mr. Smith has at all times denied being the driver
at the time of the accident. The presentence investigator noted, “Mr. Smith still does not believe
he was the driver of the vehicle.” (PSI, p.22) While Mr. Smith acknowledges the jury’s verdict,
he contends the district court should have considered at sentencing the conflicting evidence
regarding whether he or Mr. Sikes was driving at the time of the accident. Moreover, Mr. Smith
sustained serious injuries in the accident, and currently suffers from PTSD as a result of the
accident. (PSI, p.16.) He has suffered, and will continue to suffer, even absent a lengthy term of
incarceration. Mr. Smith acknowledges he was a very heavy drinker prior to the accident, and
recognizes he needs treatment for his alcohol addiction. (PSI, p.18.) But a lengthy term of
incarceration is simply not warranted by the nature of the offense.
The sentence the district court imposed upon Mr. Smith was also not reasonable
considering his character. Mr. Smith was employed as a foreman at a fencing company prior to
being incarcerated for the instant offense. (PSI, p.14.) He was 25 years old at the time of
sentencing, with the majority of his life before him. (PSI, p.23.) This was his first felony
conviction, and there is every indication (and hope) that he can turn his life around if he is able to
avoid drinking. (PSI, pp.7-8.) Mr. Smith wrote to the district court in advance of sentencing,
asking the court for leniency. (PSI, pp.36-37.) He explained that he had great remorse about the
accident, and had suffered greatly as a result. (PSI, p.36.) He asked for help in achieving
sobriety and recognized the true damage his alcohol addiction had caused. (PSI, p.36.) He
apologized to the Mr. Shaw’s family at sentencing and said he would do anything he could to
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help them if they are ever in need. (Tr., p.436, Ls.18-23.) Mr. Smith’s character did not warrant
a lengthy term of incarceration.
Finally, the sentence the district court imposed is not necessary to protect the public
interest. Mr. Smith needs help with his alcohol addiction. He does not need to be incarcerated in
order to receive this help. In fact, considering the fact that he will be released at some point, it is
in the public’s best interests for Mr. Smith to receive treatment in a community setting, so he can
address the factors that lead him to drink in the real world. Mr. Smith made the terrible choice to
drink alcohol with two of his friends, and get into a vehicle when none of the three were fit to
drive. That decision cost Mr. Smith and his friends tremendously, but the public interest is not
served by incarcerating Mr. Smith for a term of up to fifteen years as a result. Considering all
the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding the aggravating factors, the
district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Smith to an aggregate unified term of
fifteen years, with three and one-half years fixed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Smith respectfully requests that the Court reduce his aggregate sentence to a unified
term of ten years, with two years fixed. Alternatively, he requests that the Court remand this
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 4th day of October, 2018.

/s/ Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of October, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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